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Abstract
Short-term contracts provide weak incentives for durable input investment if post-contract
asset transfer is diﬃcult. Our model shows that when both agents provide inputs, optimal
contract length balances weak incentives of one agent against the other. This perspective
broadens the existing contract duration literature, which emphasizes the tradeoﬀ between
risk sharing and contract costs. We develop hypotheses and test them based on private
grazing contracts from the Southern Great Plains. We ﬁnd broad support for the implications
of our model. For example, landowners provide durable land-speciﬁc inputs more often under
annual versus multiyear contracts.
1 Introduction
In his seminal article on agricultural land leases, Cheung (1969) discusses the choice of con-
tract duration as a component of contract design. He argues that long leases are chosen when
the costs of transferring tenant assets attached to the land are high, or if the depreciation
of assets beyond the contract period are diﬃcult to assess and therefore diﬃcult to price
for transfer to the landowner. On the other hand, short-term contracts reduce the costs
of enforcing contract stipulations and the costs of renegotiation or tenant dismissal in the
face of market uncertainties, poor tenant performance, or disputes over poorly deﬁned rights
to assets. When the tenant’s land-speciﬁc assets are exhausted within the contract period
or if the landowner provides the land-speciﬁc permanent assets, then short term contracts
become more viable.
Agricultural contracts have been an epicenter of empirical research on contract design and
analysis of the relative importance of risk preferences versus transaction costs as determinants
1of contract design (Rao, 1971; Allen and Lueck, 1995, for example).1 This empirical literature
has focused primarily on the choice between cash rent and crop share contracts, and on the
parallel issue of input cost sharing as an element of contract design. The emphasis in this
literature is the extent to which contracts are designed to address tradeoﬀs between aligning
incentives by specifying parallel cost share arrangements on one hand and contracting costs
on the other during the contract period.
Researchers have recognized an important distinction regarding how inputs are provided.
In some cases, input costs are not readily shared, and “nonmarket” inputs are provided
by either the tenant or the landowner directly (Reid, 1979; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985;
Allen and Lueck, 1993, for example). When these nonmarket inputs are part of contractual
responsibilities, contract duration can become important. In particular, if the productive
life of inputs extends beyond the contract period and if post-contract transfer of asset rights
is diﬃcult, the extent to which tenant or landowner becomes residual claimant of input
productivity depends on contract duration. This aﬀects incentives for input provision by
each party to the contract.
The empirical literature examining the relationship between contract duration and the
division of input responsibilities is thin. Allen and Lueck (1992) is one empirical analysis
of agricultural land contracts that examines contract duration explicitly. Their premise is
that the choice of contract length depends primarily on three factors: 1) mutual information
about the reputation of contractees, 2) the existence of contract speciﬁc (sunk) assets and
3) the costs of contract renewal and of complex contingent contacts to address changing
market conditions. Their point estimates show that their proxy for sunk assets (investment
in irrigation) has a negative but statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the length of a contract.
Although Allen and Lueck (1992) examine the determinants of contract duration and brieﬂy
discuss its relationship between the division of input responsibilities and contract duration,
they do not empirically examine this relationship.
1Empirical studies on cost share contracts in other markets include Leﬄer and Rucker (1991) focusing on
timber contracts and Hallagan (1978) on share contracting for gold, among others.
2The objective of the present article is to examine the division of labor between landowner
and tenant under limited-duration land lease contracts that require land-speciﬁc durable
input investment. The model extends the existing literature in the following ways. First, it
considers the eﬀect of both the contract period and the post-contract period on incentives for
input investment. Second, the model allows contract duration to be endogenous. Third, the
model provides a basis for choosing for contact duration that is diﬀerent from the existing
literature on contract duration.
In regards to the literature on contract duration, two primary perspectives are of interest
here. One perspective hypothesizes that the choice of contract duration pivots on the tradeoﬀ
between real or nominal market uncertainty on the one hand and transaction costs associated
with renegotiation on the other (Rich and Tracy, 2004; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Wallace
and Blanco, 1991; Danziger, 1988; Crocker and Masten, 1988; Gray, 1978). Another focuses
on the eﬀects of relationship-speciﬁc assets on contract duration. For example, Joskow (1987)
ﬁnds that length of coal supply contracts increases when relationship-speciﬁc assets are a
dominant part of contracts. Our perspective is based on the importance of relationship-
speciﬁc assets on contract length. When contracts involve two or more agents providing
site-speciﬁc inputs, residual-claimancy will diﬀer between the agents during and after the
contract, and contract length may be chosen to balance the opposing incentives of the agents.
Our model provides simple and intuitive implications. In a short-term contract where
nonmarket inputs with uncertain depreciation rates are provided but diﬃcult to monitor,
landowners will tend to be responsible for provision of durable land-speciﬁc inputs, whereas
tenants will tend to be responsible for inputs whose productive value is ﬂeeting. Furthermore,
when one or more inputs are provided individually by each party, the optimal contract length
is that which balances the marginal eﬀects of weak incentives for input provision at the
margin.
Implications of the model are empirically tested using data from Oklahoma statewide
farmland leasing surveys conducted in 1998, 2000, and 2002. Most of the existing empirical
3research on farmland contracts focuses on leasing for annual crop production. In contrast,
our data relate to private land leases for grazing rights on either native perennial pasture or
annual wheat pasture. Livestock grazing requires the provision of inputs that are diﬀerent
than those for crop production including, among other things, an increased importance of
investment in and maintenance of fences, labor for checking on the health and location of
the livestock, and the provision of supplemental feed when pasture forage production is
insuﬃcient. Based on a battery of means tests and a Tobit regression applied to these data,
we ﬁnd broad support for our model. Thus, in addition to the contributions of the theoretical
model, this article provides empirical results relating to a diﬀerent type of land lease contract
than those that have been widely studied, and is unique in its focus on the division of input
responsibilities in short-term contracts.
2 Speciﬁc assets and the division of labor
In an arrangement in which costs, beneﬁts, and resource allocation decisions are shared
among two or more parties, resources may not be eﬃciently allocated if the contract does
not assign expected net present value of beneﬁts in the same proportion as the expected
net present value of costs. The incentive to shirk on contracted input responsibilities result
when full observation and monitoring of actions are either impossible or prohibitively costly
(Holmstrom, 1979). Asymmetric information between contracting agents, output uncertainty
and existence of many absentee landowners, each can play a role in monitoring problems.
For example, in a grazing lease contract between a pasture owner and a livestock owner, if
the landowner is responsible for checking livestock, the livestock owner cannot costlessly or
perfectly detect landowner eﬀort. Although the livestock owner can make some inferences
about the landowner’s eﬀort from the status of the property at any given moment, this
imperfect signal is not enough to induce fully eﬃcient pasture-owner eﬀort.
A model of the distribution of beneﬁts and the incentives of landowners and lessees is
4developed in this section. The landowner and tenant are assumed to be identical except for
their position in the contract as residual claimants. They have identical productive capacity
for any given input, each is assumed to have the same (ﬁxed) marginal opportunity cost
for any given input. Mounting empirical evidence suggests that transaction costs rather
than relative risk aversion are the primary determinants of contract structure (Leﬄer and
Rucker, 1991; Allen and Lueck, 1999; Prendergast, 2002). We therefore assume risk neutrality
for both parties to the contract, and further assume that objective of the contractees is to
maximize the net expected returns to the land with respect to a speciﬁc input that is applied
during the contract period. Following Stiglitz (1974) and others since, assume also that the
value of production during the contract period and the post-contract period is stochastic.
We begin by examining the incentives of the tenant and landowner individually in a
model with one input, provided by either one agent or the other. This one-dimensional
input investment problem suﬃces to generate a number of testable hypotheses about the
optimal choice of input provider. We then include another input to further examine optimal
contract duration. Inputs are often provided by either the landowner or the tenant, but not
both (about 93.5 percent of the total number of inputs in our survey sample). It is well
known, however, that skewed incentives in share contracts can be corrected by equating the
input cost share with the output cost share (Heady, 1971). We therefore consider the case
in which costs and/or responsibilities for speciﬁc inputs are shared, as a relatively small
percentage of our sample suggests. Allen and Lueck (1993) hypothesize and ﬁnd evidence
that the costs of market inputs provided by third parties are more likely to be shared in
the same proportion as the output, while nonmarket inputs are more likely to be the sole
responsibility of the tenant. We extend that argument to recognize that it may be best
for the landowner to have sole responsibility for input provision, particularly for durable
investments.
5Inputs provided by only one agent
Consider the present value of production from a parcel of land in which one of the agents
provide a one-time investment in an input x that depreciates in productive capacity at an
expected rate of δ over time. Although the expected value of depreciation is known, the
exact ex post rate is unknown ex ante. Therefore transfer of rights to the depreciated asset
at the end of the contract is diﬃcult. We assume a simple stochastic production process with
expected value f(x,t) = e−δt ln(x) for x > 1 (zero otherwise), input cost of c. The expected














where r is the interest rate, δ is the depreciation rate, x is the level of input investment,
and T is the contract length, taken to be exogenous for now. The ﬁrst-order condition for a










Suppose now that the landowner and tenant agree to either a ﬁxed per acre cash rental
payment, paid in full at the beginning of the contract, or a share contract under which
each agent receives some share of the value of production under the contract. With a cash
rent contract, landowner remuneration is not dependent on realized output from the current
contract, but, given that uncertainty and contracting costs preclude explicit transfer of rights
from tenant to landowner at the end of the contract, the landowner does beneﬁt from any
6remaining productivity of the input after the contract expires.2 In a share contract the
landowner retains a share of the output for the contract period as well.
If the tenant receives share s of the value of production during the contract and the
landowner receives share 1 − s plus all of the post-contract residual beneﬁt, the beneﬁt












































Equation 4 is broken down into two parts: the ﬁrst set of brackets contains the stream of
value acquired by the tenant (V n) and the second is acquired by the landowner (V l). If the
landowner provides the input, he will choose xl to maximize the second element in brackets
and will not account for the ﬁrst element in brackets. The tenant does not beneﬁt from
input productivity after the contract has expired, and so will choose xn to maximize the ﬁrst















For a given input cost c, contract duration T ∈ (0,∞) and s ∈ (0,1), both the tenant
and landowner provide less than the eﬃcient input levels as described by equations 3.3 The
2Symmetrically, if the inputs provide beneﬁts that are speciﬁc to the livestock beyond the contract
duration, then the livestock owner retains the beneﬁts beyond contract expiration.
3Given the incentive problems inherent in the model as designed above, the value of production would not
be maximized with a contract among two parties. The incentive problems would disappear and the value of
production would be maximized if the livestock owner were also the landowner and also provided all inputs.
Because this paper focuses on contracts themselves, however, we assume that a contract among two parties
is optimal, rather than sole ownership and input provision by a single party. See Barzel (1989), chapter 3
for a discussion of the costs of sole ownership.
7crucial point here is that each input provider is a partial residual claimant in the relationship,
because contracts have limited duration, monitoring is too costly to perform, and input levels
cannot be inferred exactly from output (Barzel, 2002).
The comparative statics for a change in input investment with respect to a change in




















For compactness let d = r+δ. The function e−dT(dT +1) falls in the unit interval for positive
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Equations 6 and 7 indicate that the depreciation rate reduces input investment for both the
tenant and landowner, but for any increase in the depreciation rate, the landowner reduces
input investment more than the tenant.
The eﬀect of an increase in δ, T and s on the present value of proﬁts can be seen most
clearly through its eﬀects on xn and xl. Note that
xn
xl = 1 at

      











˜ s = 1
2(1−e−(r+δ)T)
8Ceteris Paribus, the tenant underinvests more than the landowner if δ < ˜ δ, T < ˜ T, or if
s < ˜ s.4 Given that the total contract value V is maximized at xe (the optimal input level for
a decision maker who owns both the pasture and the cattle) and declines as the x deviates
from it, it also follows that
V (x
l) > V (x
n) if

      
      
δ < ˜ δ
T < ˜ T
s < ˜ s
(8)
Figure 1 shows the change in contract value with respect to a change in the depreciation
rate δ. At low depreciation rates it contract value is maximized by placing the responsibility
for input provision on the landowner.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The following testable hypotheses follow from the relationships shown by the inequalities (8):
Hypothesis 1. As the output share to the landowner (1 − s) increases, the landowner will
more likely be responsible for input provision.
Hypothesis 2. As the longevity of input productivity increases (as depreciation rate de-
creases), the landowner will more likely be responsible for input provision.
Hypothesis 3. As contract length decreases, the landowner will more likely be responsible
for input provision.
Input cost sharing
As Allen and Lueck (1993) point out, nonmarketed goods are likely to be provided by either
the tenant or the landowner, while the costs of market goods (provided by a third party)
4Given the speciﬁc functional forms used, ˜ δ is not deﬁned for s ≤ 0.5.
9are more likely to be shared. With market goods, input cost shares should be designed such
that each party provides inputs at eﬃcient levels (represented by equation 2). The input













An output share for the tenant of s = 1 induces less-than-eﬃcient tenant input provision
given no input cost-sharing, but a share of s < 1 leads to still less input provision. Therefore,
the optimal input cost share for the tenant would be lower if the tenant’s output share is
less than one. This leads to one additional hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. If input costs are divisible (in the sense that it is optimal to divide the costs
for a speciﬁc input), then input cost sharing will be more likely under share contracts than
under cash rent contracts.
It is worth emphasizing also that when input investment provides productive capacity
beyond the contract period, optimal input and output shares will not be equal, as is the case
when all beneﬁts are accrued during the contract period (Heady, 1971). More speciﬁcally,
if an asset is land-speciﬁc, the tenant’s (landowner’s) optimal input share is smaller (larger)
than his output share.
3 Optimal contract duration
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper relates to the existing literature on relationship-
speciﬁc assets and their eﬀect on the choice of contract length. This literature generally
ﬁnds that longer term contracts tend to be adopted to reduce the risk of expropriation of
relationship-speciﬁc assets (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). On the other hand, the costs of
longer term contracts are generally thought to be eﬃciency losses due to contract rigidities
10in the face of market uncertainty. Below we show an additional cost associated with longer
contracts for cases in which input providers are not the post-contract residual claimants of
remaining input productivity. To use the terminology of Williamson (1983), site-speciﬁcity
applies to many investments associated with grazing leases, wherein the landowner is likely
to be the residual claimant of of input productivity beyond the contract period. If both
the tenant and landowner provide one or more inputs (and our data suggest they often do),
contract length can be seen as a way to balance the opposing investment incentives of the
parties.
To justify our argument, we revert back to the assumption that a given input is provided
by one or the other party to the contact, and consider two inputs, one provided by the
landowner (xl) and one provided by the tenant (xn), each with their respective depreciation
rate, δl and δn.5 Total output is now a function of ﬁxed land and livestock and two variable
inputs, such that the expected present value of production at one point in time t can be
characterized as
V2(t) = e
−(δl+r)t lnxl + e
−(δn+r)t lnxn,









Because of separability in production, the input demands are identical to the previous input
demand equations 5a and 5b, except that they include agent-speciﬁc depreciation rates.
Once the contract has been signed for a given pair of inputs with ﬁxed depreciation
rates, the tenant will choose to invest to the point where the marginal value of the input for
the duration of the contract only is equal to marginal cost, and the landowner will choose
to invest to the point where the marginal value of the input for the period after contract
5More generally, the analysis requires only that the input costs are not shared for a subset of the inputs.
The result — an optimal contract length of ﬁnite duration — will still hold if the costs of some, but not
all, inputs are shared. Notational comment: the input demands in the previous section were denoted with
superscripts, while these are denoted by subscripts.
11expiration equals marginal cost. Thus, the longer the contract, the weaker the incentive for
the landowner, and the shorter the contract, the weaker the incentive for the tenant. Given
that each provide inputs (and assuming necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a unique
maximum are satisﬁed), some contract length will exist that maximizes the value of the
contract by balancing the moral hazard eﬀects.6 From this perspective, contract design can
be thought of intuitively as a two-step process: estimate the contract value for a set of
feasible contract lengths and choose the contract that provides the highest expected value
to be divided among the contractees.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the result for two diﬀerent sets of depreciation rates
under the assumption that one input is provided by each agent. For this ﬁgure, a cash rent
contract is assumed (s = 1) with marginal costs of 0.1 and an interest rate of 0.05. The
solid line depicts a scenario in which the depreciation rates for both inputs are equal to 0.1,
meaning that each productive capacity diminishes slowly. The consequence is a long contract
of about 4 and a half years. In contrast, if the tenant provides an input that depreciates much
more rapidly (in this example, with a depreciation rate of 0.9), then the optimal contract
length is substantially shorter, at about 1.2 years. This short contract results in a larger
proportion of the productive value of the input being captured by the landowner after the
contract period, thus strengthening his investment incentive.
It is clear from this analysis that when conditions make cost-sharing and post-contract
asset transfer diﬃcult, contract length may be determined in part by trading oﬀ eﬃciency
losses from poor investment incentives of each agent. Although our data do not allow ex-
plicit testing of this perspective on contract duration, it is useful for comparison to the more
common perspective on contract duration that emphasizes the tradeoﬀ between transaction
costs and the costs of contractual rigidities under market uncertainties. These two perspec-
6A working paper by Barzel (2002) provides a discussion somewhat similar to our argument in this section,
but in a diﬀerent context.
12tives on contract duration are not mutually exclusive, and their relative importance in terms
of contract design is an empirical issue.
4 Data and testing methods
Data to test hypotheses 2 – 4 were obtained from the Oklahoma statewide farmland leasing
surveys conducted in December of 1998, 2000 and 2002 (Doye et al., 1999, 2001, 2002)
Questionnaires were mailed to individuals involved in farming in Oklahoma. The 1998,
2000, and 2002 surveys included useable observations of 536, 568 and 552 respectively. Each
questionnaire includes a section that focuses on wheat pasture grazing leases, and another
section that focuses on other pasture leases. Each observation in the dataset created from
the survey responses represents a single lease contract between a tenant and a landowner
for a grazing lease in which the tenant is the livestock owner and the landowner is the
pasture/forage owner. Summary statistics for all variables used are shown in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
The data used on the analysis below include information on
• the type of payment from the tenant to the landowner,
• the duration of the contract (annual or multi-year),
• a list of common inputs and who is responsible for providing them,
• the type of pasture.
With regard to the type of payment, respondents were asked to identify rental price
payment method based on a set of alternatives. If the payment method was $/acre/year or
$/acre/month or $/head/month, the contract was classiﬁed as a cash rent contract because
it is based on input usage, not output levels. If the method was $ per pound of gain, $ per
pound of weight per month, or partnership, the contract was considered a share contract.
13A list of speciﬁc input-related tasks is also provided in the questionnaire, and respondents
were asked to specify whether the landowner, the tenant, or both were responsible for each
of the tasks listed. This analysis focuses on input durability in relation to contract duration,
so of the inputs listed, we focus on those inputs that seem either durable and ﬁxed (with
beneﬁts from investment that may extend beyond the contract and accrue to the landowner),
or are ﬂeeting (accrue during the contract to the current tenant). The input information
we use includes who (the tenant or the landowner) provides the following inputs: fencing
materials, fencing labor, checking livestock, supplemental feeding, supplemental pasture, and
fertilizer cost. There are two important pasture types: wheat pasture, and other pasture or
range, which we will refer to as native pasture. Wheat is an annual grass, and winter wheat
grazing is a common practice in the southern Great Plains. Cattle are placed on wheat
pasture during early wheat development, and removed prior to a speciﬁc developmental stage
called ﬁrst jointing, after which point grazing will substantially negatively aﬀect wheat grain
production. Native pasture includes native grasses, bermuda grass, Old World bluestem,
and fescue – each of which are perennial grasses.
We hypothesize that of all inputs, fencing materials are most durable (small δ). Fencing
labor often must be applied in a timely manner, and the beneﬁts of timeliness will generally
accrue to the current tenant, so δ is larger. Checking livestock is hypothesized to be mostly
of beneﬁt to the current tenant, and again, timeliness is likely to be important. Supplemental
feeding is a bit more complex. Beneﬁts surely accrue to the tenant, because it will aﬀect
livestock weight gain. However, supplemental feed also may beneﬁt the landowner to the
extent that it reduces overgrazing in worse-than-expected forage conditions, because long-
term forage productivity can be diminished on rangeland as a consequence of overgrazing
Ellison (1960). The type of pasture matters, however. In particular, excessive pressure
on perennial grasses may have substantial long-term impacts, but it may have little or no
long-term eﬀects on annual wheat.7
7The pasture owner could conceivably be aﬀected by the impact of overgrazing on wheat yield. However,
evidence suggests that grazing wheat has little impact on wheat yield as long as the cattle are removed
14We perform two types of tests for the hypotheses listed above. We begin with simple
tests for diﬀerences in the proportion of contracts for which the landowner provides an input
for given diﬀerent conditions (e.g. pasture type) or contract type (e.g cash rent or share
contract). We then estimate Tobit regressions to control for other factors that might aﬀect
the probability of one outcome or another.8
From a theoretical perspective, we implicitly employ a random utility model framework.
As researchers, we do not perfectly observe the variation in contract value as a function of
input choice, but the theoretical model suggests, that variation will lead to diﬀerent assign-
ments of input responsibilities. Based on this framework, if a signiﬁcantly higher proportion
of landowners (rather than tenants) provide an input under condition A as compared to con-
dition B, it is because the value of contract tends to be higher when the landowner provides
the input under condition A.
For the means test, let ni be the number of contracts for which the landowner provides
an input under condition i = 1,2. The sample proportion of contracts for which landowner
provides the input is p1 = ni/ni+,where ni+ is the total number of contracts under condi-
tion i. The sample proportion pi has a binomial distribution with standard error se(pi) =
p
pi(1 − pi)/ni+. Assuming the two groups represent independent binomial samples, their
diﬀerence is d = p1 − p2, for which the standard error is se(d) =
p
var(p1) + var(p2). Using
the normal approximation to the binomial distribution, the test statistic is calculated as
z = d/se(d), where z has a standard normal distribution. If z is suﬃciently large such that
the p-value is less than the chosen critical value, the null hypothesis of d = 0 is rejected
(Agresti, 1990). Because our hypotheses imply one sided alternative hypotheses, we provide
p-values for one-sided and two-sided tests. See (Greene, 2003, pp. 764-768) for a discussion
of Tobit regression. The econometric software Stata (2004) was used for all means tests and
regressions.
before a speciﬁc point in the wheat maturation process known as ﬁrst hollow stem (Hossain et al., 2003).
8We have no information regarding input shares for the cases in which the respondent reported that both
the tenant and landowner a speciﬁc input. We therefore omit these observations for our analyses to focus
on those inputs for which a clear distinction about the input provider is reported.
155 Results and discussion
We examine the division of input responsibilities in a number of ways: 1) We examine the
eﬀects of output share on input provision, 2) we compare the relationship between input
durability and input provision, 3) we examine the diﬀerences in input provision in short-
versus long-term contracts, 4) we compare input provision associated with perennial versus
annual forage, and 5) we examine the eﬀects of various contract characteristics on the total
number of inputs provided by the landowner.
Eﬀects of output share on input responsibilities
Table 2 provides results of t-tests for diﬀerences in the proportion of contracts for which only
landowners are responsible for inputs under share contracts (p1) and cash rent contracts (p2).
[Table 2 about here.]
Based on hypothesis 1, the signs of the diﬀerences p1−p2 should be positive in each case,
and the results are consistent with the hypothesis in this respect in every case: Inputs were
provided more often by landowners for share contracts than for cash rent contracts. For
example, landowners provided all fencing materials in about 57 percent of share contracts
but only 34 percent of cash contracts — a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence of about 23
percent.
For a relatively small percentage of inputs, about 6.5 percent, both the tenant and the
landowner are responsible for input provision. Table 3 provides tests that the proportion of
contracts in which inputs are provided by both parties is diﬀerent for share contracts (p1)
than for cash rent contracts (p2). If contracts attempt to align input shares with output
shares according to hypothesis 4, we should see p1 − p2 > 0.
[Table 3 about here.]
16The proportion of fencing materials and labor provided by both parties is not statistically
diﬀerent between cash rent and share contracts. However, the results for the rest of the inputs
are consistent with theory. For example, supplemental feed is provided by both parties in
share contracts about 9 percent of the time but only about 4 percent of the time in cash
rent contracts. Thus, although input responsibilities are shared relatively rarely in this
sample, they tend to be shared in share contracts more so than in cash rent contracts.
The insigniﬁcance of the tests for fencing materials and labor is interesting. One potential
explanation for this result relates to the longevity of investment in fences. As the longevity
of fencing increases, the optimal input cost share for the tenant declines. Similarly, as the
output share to the tenant declines, so does the optimal input share.
In the case of a long-lived input, the optimal tenant input share may be so small that
the eﬃciency gains are not worth the eﬀort it takes to divide the input responsibilities.9
In this case, it may make sense more sense for the landowner to provide all of an input
under a share contract, but for input responsibilities to be shared under cash rent contract.
This corollary to hypothesis 4 is supported by an additional pair of tests based on the more
durable inputs of fencing materials and fencing labor. The tests use a truncated sample
that excludes those observations for which only the tenant provides the input. Based on
this sample, we test whether the proportion of contracts with an input provided by only
the landowner is diﬀerent from the proportion of contracts with an input provided by both
agents. fencing costs are shared for inputs signiﬁcantly more under cash rent contracts than
under share contracts. For fencing materials, p1 − p2 = −0.113, with a two-sided p-value of
0.0072. For fencing labor, p1 − p2 = −0.151, with a two-sided p-value of 0.0017. These two
results are much larger (in absolute value) than the negative but statistically insigniﬁcant
diﬀerences presented in Table 3.
9Speciﬁcally, in equation 9, if δ is very small and s is small, then sn will be small.
17Inputs of diﬀerent durability
Consider fencing materials and fencing labor. The quality of fencing materials aﬀects the
durability of a fence, and the productive life of these materials are likely to extend beyond
a one or even a ﬁve year contract. Fencing labor aﬀects the longevity of a fence, but im-
portantly, the timeliness of fencing repair (fencing labor) may clearly aﬀect the containment
of the current livestock herd. If fencing labor is not applied in a timely manner livestock
are likely to escape, creating a hazard for the livestock, additional work collecting them,
and even liability concerns. Thus, we hypothesize that fencing labor has, generally, a more
immediate value (larger δ) and is more likely to be provided by the livestock owner than is
fencing materials. This hypothesis is a speciﬁc case of the general hypothesis 2 on page 9.
Using the same logic, we hypothesize that the beneﬁts of fertilizer application, provision
of supplemental feed and pasture, and checking livestock have increasingly short-duration or
more timely beneﬁts, and therefore will also more likely be provided by the livestock owner
than will fencing materials. Table 4 shows the results of tests that compare the proportion
of contracts in which fencing materials were provided by the landowner (proportion p1) with
the proportion of contracts in which fencing labor, fertilizer, supplemental feed, supplemental
pasture, and livestock monitoring were provided by the landowner (proportion p2). In each
case, the hypothesized diﬀerence in proportions p1 − p2, is positive.
[Table 4 about here.]
The results presented in Table 4 strongly support the hypotheses discussed above, with
positive diﬀerences p1 − p2 in each case. For example, landowners provide fencing materials
approximately 38 percent of the contracts, but are responsible for checking livestock in
approximately 24 percent of the contracts, for a diﬀerence of approximately 14 percent.
Notice also that the inputs in Table 4 are arranged so that the diﬀerences increase with
the row number. This arrangement provides an ordering of input types that seems quite
consistent with increasingly less durable inputs.
18Diﬀerences between annual and multiyear contracts
Incentives of tenants to provide durable site-speciﬁc inputs are weakest for short contracts
and stronger for longer contracts. Similarly, landowners have weaker incentives to provide
inputs during a longer contract — particularly a cash rent contract — because the beneﬁts
will accrue more to the tenant. Therefore, we expect landowners to provide inputs more
often for annual contracts than for multi-year contracts for durable inputs, and zero for
non-durable inputs (hypothesis 3).
Table 5 shows the results of tests that the proportion of a given input provided by the
landowner is larger for annual contracts than for multi-year contracts. These comparisons of
input provision between annual and multi-year contracts are likely to be particularly sensitive
to whether or not the contracting parties have long term relationships beyond the duration
of the contract. We expect that individuals with no long term relationships face pronounced
moral hazard issues, because the eﬀects of shirking are less likely to carry over into other
aspects of their relationship, including future contracts. Therefore, we have included two
sets of results. The ﬁrst is based on the entire sample, and the second is based only on the
2002 sample, because the 2002 survey is the only one in which the respondents were asked
if the parties to the contract were related. We do not have this information for the other
years. Whether or not the parties to the contract have familial ties is an imperfect measure
of long term relationships, but it is a strong indicator, nonetheless.
[Table 5 about here.]
Consider the diﬀerence in the proportion of annual contracts versus the proportion of
multiyear contracts in which the landowner provides fencing materials. Based on all con-
tracts, landowners provide fencing materials 7.5 percent more often for annual contracts
than for multiyear contracts because, as we hypothesize, they have stronger incentives at the
margin to invest in durable fences. For unrelated parties, the diﬀerence is about 12 percent.
The results presented in Table 5 are consistent with our theory in three ways. First, all
19diﬀerences in proportions that are statistically signiﬁcant are positive as hypothesized. The
only negative signs are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
Second, the diﬀerences in proportions are largest for fencing materials, fencing labor, and
fertilizer provision, which we maintain are those inputs with the highest durability. Third,
even though the sample size is substantially smaller for tests based on unrelated parties
only, all diﬀerences in proportions are positive as hypothesized, and the three inputs highest
potential for long term eﬀects are positive at conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
Allen and Lueck (1992) test whether annual contracts are less likely on irrigated land
than in non-irrigated land, based on the maintained hypothesis that investment in irrigation
technology opens up contractees to rent appropriation. They ﬁnd a negative but statistically
insigniﬁcant relationship between irrigation and annual contracts. The negative relationship
is consistent with our view of long-term investment in land-speciﬁc assets if landowners
were the party responsible for investment in irrigation technology. Allen and Lueck (1992)
do not, however, have information in the division of irrigation input responsibilities, and so
were unable to make this distinction.
Conservation and investment for annual versus perennial forage
Declining ecological condition on rangeland and pasture is a common consequence of over-
grazing (Ellison, 1960). Native grassland in particular may suﬀer substantial long-term
negative eﬀects in terms of the land’s productive capacity due to overgrazing. In contrast,
overgrazing is not likely to be a major problem on wheat pasture because it is an annual
crop; overgrazing this year will most likely not aﬀect next year’s grazing or wheat production
nearly as much as on perennial grasses.
From this point of view, it can be argued that supplemental feed and supplemental
pasture have a lower δ for native grassland and other perennial grasses than for (annual)
wheat pasture. Landowners of native pasture will be more concerned about long-term pasture
productivity on native perennial grasses than on wheat pasture, and so will more often be
20responsible for supplemental feed and supplemental pasture for native grassland than for
wheat pasture leases. This is essentially a restatement of hypothesis 2, where input durability
plays a role as an investment in future forage productivity.
The same logic can be applied to fertilizer application, but one important diﬀerence
exists between fertilizer application and supplemental feed. On wheat pasture, fertilizer
aﬀects forage production, but it has the important eﬀect of increasing this years wheat grain
production, for which the landowner — not the tenant — is the residual claimant.10 Thus, if
the marginal value of fertilizer for wheat production tends to overpower the marginal value
of fertilizer for future (post-contract) perennial grass production, then the landowner will be
more likely to provide fertilizer on wheat pasture. In a sense, even if the grazing contract
is cash rent, the beneﬁts from fertilizer application of wheat pasture are shared even in the
short term, so the landowner is more likely to provide it than otherwise (hypothesis 1).
[Table 6 about here.]
Table 6 provides results of tests for diﬀerences in the proportion of perennial versus wheat
pasture contracts in which the landowner provides supplemental feed, supplemental pasture,
and fertilizer. The expected diﬀerence p1 −p2 is positive for supplemental feed and pasture.
The sign of p1 − p2 for fertilizer is negative if the marginal value of fertilizer for annual
wheat yield outweighs the marginal value of fertilizer for long term (post-contract) forage
productivity.
The results for supplemental feed are strong and consistent with theory. For example,
pasture producers provide supplemental feed for perennial pasture almost 6 percent more
often than for wheat pasture when all observations (including both annual and multiyear
contracts) are included. The results for supplemental pasture are not inconsistent with
hypothesis 1, but are odd in that the expected eﬀect is strong in multiyear contracts, but
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for annual contracts. The results for fertilizer show that
10It is sometimes the case where grazing land involves three people: a landowner, a wheat-growing tenant,
and a livestock owner. We do not have information to distinguish cases such as these, so we treat the
landowner and pasture producer as the same, even though they may be diﬀerent individuals.
21pasture owners are much more likely to provide fertilizer on wheat than on perennial pasture,
which strongly suggest that the short-run shared beneﬁts of fertilizer far outweigh the longer-
run incentives for beneﬁts to perennial forage.
Tobit regressions
To summarize the relationship among diﬀerent components of grazing contracts, we estimate
a regression on the number of inputs (out of 8) provided by the landowner in a given contract,
as a function of other contract characteristics. The results are presented in Table 7. The
binary explanatory variables include whether or not the contract is annual or multi-year
(annual), whether or not the contract was written or oral (written), whether or not the
contract is a rent (cash) or a share contract (share), and whether or not the contractees are
related by family (related). Regression 1 includes each of these independent variables, but
because there are numerous missing observations on cash and related we have included two
additional regressions. Regression 2 omits related and regression 3 omits related and cash.
The dependent variable in each regressions is the natural log of the number of inputs,
out of a total of eight, that are provided by the landowner. In each case, the regression anal-
ysis is based on the Tobit model with censoring at zero and eight, because in a substantial
proportion of the contracts the landowner provided either all or none of the inputs.11 The
variable written is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for written contracts and
zero for oral contracts. This is included because, we hypothesize, the preference for writ-
ten contracts may signal that the contractees are less familiar with each other, which may
11For contracts in which the landowner provided no inputs, the zero value was replaced with 0.0001 for
a ﬁnite natural log. A log transformation is used because preliminary regressions showed an improved ﬁt.
Given this speciﬁcation, the estimated percent changes of the dependent variable for these binary variables








· (exp([βj − 0.5vj] − 1))
where dj is the jth dummy variable, vj is the estimated variance of the coeﬃcient βj for the jth dummy
variable, and Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative density function. See Van Garderen and Shah (2002)
for details about estimating dummy variable eﬀects in log linear models and Greene (2003) for details of the
Tobit regression model.
22aﬀect the degree of expected cooperation and shirking in input investments. The variable
related is included for the same reason — to account for the inﬂuence of potential long-term
relationships among contractees.
[Table 7 about here.]
Recall that when input investment provides beneﬁts beyond the duration of the contract,
landowners will have a stronger incentive for investment than otherwise, so for a given set of
inputs, landowners will have stronger incentives for input investment with shorter contracts
(hypothesis 3). In all three cases, the coeﬃcient on annual is positive (and signiﬁcant for
the larger sample sizes. The variable written has no apparent eﬀect on the general incentive
for landowner provision of inputs.
Holding contract duration constant, landowners are expected to provide inputs more often
in share contracts than in cash rent contracts (hypothesis 1). The negative (and signiﬁcant)
coeﬃcients on cash are consistent with this hypothesis.
Finally, the coeﬃcient on related is negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that tenants
provide inputs more often when the contractees are related. This might suggest that the
potential to shirk on durable-input investment is a more substantial problem than investment
in inputs of short-term value.
In summary, the results presented in the three Tobit regressions in Table 7 are qualita-
tively consistent with theory.
6 Conclusion
The relationship between contract duration, input longevity, and the division of input re-
sponsibilities is an important aspect of contract design that has received relatively little
attention in the large literature on agricultural land lease contracts. Beneﬁts from agri-
cultural inputs may extend beyond the contract period, and when private actions cannot
be monitored or inferred exactly from output and property rights to assets are not readily
23transferred at the end of the contract, each party is a partial — not complete — residual
claimant of input investment, so private input incentives are weak, and do act to maximize
total contract value.
Our theoretical model focuses on the relationship between contract duration and input
investment. We show that in order to maximize contract value, landowners are more likely
to be the input provider for shorter contracts, for durable site-speciﬁc inputs, and for share
contracts rather than cash rent contracts. Further, we show how contract duration can
chosen to balance optimally balance the weak investment incentives of each agent.
We test implications of the model using data on grazing leases of the Southern Great
Plains of the United States. We test for diﬀerences in the proportion of contracts for which
landowners provide inputs under various conditions, and we estimate a series of Tobit re-
gressions that model the probability that the landowner provides a given input. The results
are generally consistent with the hypotheses that follow from our theory. Landowners tend
to take responsibility for inputs that have long-term consequences and when they accrue
a share of the output during the contract period. Tenants tend to have responsibility for
inputs that have short-term consequences and for cash rent contracts.
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28Figure 1: Change in contract value with respect to a change in the depreciation rate δ.
Tenant investment xt is lowest for low depreciation rates and landowner investment is lowest
for high depreciation rates. Evaluated at s = 1, c = 0.1, and T = 4.
29Figure 2: Diﬀerent contract durations for diﬀerent depreciation rates δ. Long contracts are
associated with lower depreciation rates for landowner-provided inputs. Value functions have
been normalized for graphical comparison. See text on page 12 for speciﬁcation details.
30Table 1: Summary Statistics. Sample Proportions. One minus the value is the proportion
for the alternative.
Proportion Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Written contract 1656 0.37 0.483 0 1
Annual lease 1656 0.628 0.483 0 1
Wheat, annual grasses 1656 0.266 0.442 0 1
Cash rent 1656 0.294 0.456 0 1
Related parties (2002 only) 552 0.185 0.388 0 1
Pasture owner checks livestock 1656 0.242 0.428 0 1
Pasture owner provides fence materials 1656 0.352 0.478 0 1
Pasture owner provides fencing labor 1656 0.299 0.458 0 1
Pasture owner provides fertilizer 1656 0.307 0.461 0 1
Pasture owner provides supplemental feed 1656 0.231 0.422 0 1
Past. owner provides supplemental pasture 1656 0.235 0.424 0 1
31Table 2: Tests of whether inputs are provided by only the pasture owner more often in
share contracts (p1) than cash rent contracts (p2). Predicted diﬀerence in proportions is
(p1 − p2) > 0. N=680 for all tests, unequal variances assumed.
Share Cash Diﬀerence Ha:p1−p26=0 Ha:p1−p2>0
p1 p2 p1 − p2 p-value p-value
Fencing materials 0.571 0.339 0.2318 0.0000 0.0000
Fencing labor 0.498 0.238 0.2597 0.0000 0.0000
Supplemental feed 0.239 0.170 0.0685 0.0479 0.0239
Supplemental pasture 0.307 0.175 0.1326 0.0004 0.0002
Check livestock 0.268 0.118 0.0872 0.0151 0.0075
Fertilizer 0.619 0.238 0.3816 0.0000 0.0000
32Table 3: Tests of whether inputs are provided by both the tenant and landowner more often
in share contracts (p1) than cash rent contracts (p2). Predicted diﬀerence in proportions is
(p1 − p2) > 0. N=680 for all tests, unequal variances assumed.
Share Cash Diﬀerence Ha:p1−p26=0 Ha:p1−p2>0
p1 p2 p1 − p2 p-value p-value
Supplemental feed 0.093 0.042 0.0506 0.0241 0.0120
Supplemental pasture 0.068 0.040 0.0283 0.1545 0.0772
Check livestock 0.137 0.048 0.0882 0.0008 0.0004
Fertilizer 0.151 0.067 0.0839 0.0026 0.0013
Fencing materials 0.088 0.114 -0.0259 0.2934 0.8533
Fencing labor 0.073 0.095 -0.0216 0.3417 0.8291
33Table 4: Tests for diﬀerences between proportions of hypothesized most durable input (fenc-
ing materials) provided by landowner (p1) versus proportion of less durable inputs provided
by the tenant (p2). Expected diﬀerence p1 − p2 > 0. P-values are for two sided tests:
Ha : p1 − p2 6= 0.
Fence materials: p1 = 0.3798, N=1040
Other input p2 p1 − p2 p-value
Fencing labor 0.324 0.0558 0.0001
Fertilizer 0.3067 0.0731 0.0000
Checking livestock 0.2394 0.1404 0.0000
Supplemental pasture 0.2337 0.1461 0.0000
Supplemental feed 0.2269 0.1529 0.0000
34Table 5: Tests for diﬀerences in proportions of annual (p1) and multiyear (p2) contracts in
which inputs are provided by the landowner. Expected diﬀerence: p1 − p2 > 0.
Annual Multiyear Diﬀerence Ha:p1−p26=0 Ha:p1−p2>0
p1 p2 p1 − p2 p-value p-value
All observations (N=1656)
Fencing materials .380 .305 .0746 0.0018 0.0009
Fencing labor .307 .286 .0210 0.3644 0.1822
Fertilizer .324 .278 .0464 0.0452 0.0226
Supplemental feed .227 .239 -.0117 0.5868 0.7066
Supplemental pasture .234 .237 -.0033 0.8764 0.5618
Check livestock .239 .245 -.0057 0.7937 0.6031
Unrelated parties only (N=450)
Fencing materials .418 .298 .1192 0.0084 0.0042
Fencing labor .297 .229 .2667 0.1006 0.0503
Fertilizer .333 .253 .0796 0.0644 0.0322
Supplemental feed .169 .164 .0044 0.8989 0.4495
Supplemental pasture .180 .174 .0066 0.8559 0.4279
Check livestock .177 .169 .0075 0.8335 0.4168
35Table 6: Tests for diﬀerences in proportions of supplemental feeding, supplemental pasture,
and fertilizer provided by the landowner for native grass versus wheat pasture.
Perennial Wheat Diﬀerence Ha:p1−p26=0 Ha:p1−p2>0
p1 p2 p1 − p2 p-value p-valuea
All observations (N=1656)
Supplemental feed .247 .188 .0587 0.0088 0.0044
Supplemental pasture .237 .229 .0080 0.7328 0.3664
Fertilizer .256 .447 -.1908 0.0000 1.0000
Annual contracts (N=1040)
Supplemental feed .241 .186 .0554 0.0524 0.0262
Supplemental pasture .228 .250 -.0219 0.4753 0.7624
Fertilizer .259 .515 -.2561 0.0000 1.0000
Multiyear contracts (N=616)
Supplemental feed .257 .192 .0653 0.0729 0.0364
Supplemental pasture .253 .198 .055 0.1321 0.0660
Fertilizer .251 .345 -.0941 0.0237 0.9881
aP-value for Ha : p1 − p2 < 0 is one minus the reported p-value.
36Table 7: Tobit regressions. Dependent variable: log of the number of inputs (out of 8)
provided by the landowner only. Standard errors in parentheses.
Tobit 1 Tobit 2 Tobit 3
Annual 2.021 1.694** 2.167***
(1.352) (0.847) (0.673)






Constant -2.845** -4.139*** -9.330***
(1.230) (0.999) (0.623)
ˆ σ 6.272*** 9.240*** 11.744***
(0.523) (0.416) (0.389)
N 137 680 1656
Uncensored 89 335 655
Pseudo-R2 0.0446 0.0125 0.0016
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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